| 題名: | Financial Predation by the “Weak” |
| 作者: | Spiros Bougheas Saksit Thananittayaudom |
| 關鍵字: | predation|financial contracts|Stackelberg game |
| 期刊名/會議名稱: | international journal of business and economics |
| 摘要: | We consider a Stackelberg game, where a financially constrained leader competes with_x000D_ a “deep pocket” follower, and analyze the trade-off between a financial and a strategic_x000D_ advantage for both the design of financial contracts and market structure. |
| ISSN: | issn16070704 |
| 日期: | 2006/12/01 |
| 分類: | Volume05,No.3 |
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