危機銀行與借貸往來企業的關係：來自中興銀行案例的觀察

Abstract

本研究討論中興銀行在發生財務危機，被財政部全面凍結對企業放款的業務後，之前與中興銀行有借貸往來的企業在後續投資、融資所受到的影響，以及這些企業後續轉換與其他銀行借款條件的變動。從Micro的角度來看，本研究嘗試回答：什麼類型的公司會偏好與中興銀行往來？如果銀行的好壞與往來公司的好壞有一定的群聚關係，則銀行與公司績效應有顯著的互動關連。從Macro的角度來看，本研究想討論的爭論是：金融體制以市場導向(Market-based)或銀行導向(Bank-based)何者較佳？當企業太依賴以(單一)銀行當作融資的唯一來源，則當銀行生發生危機時，往來企業日後實質投資所需要的資金將受到嚴重的融資限制，投資人可能會反應此一預期對公司價值不利的影響，而給予危機銀行事件中的往來企業股價的負面評價，所以，脆弱的銀行導向之金融體系，很能會波及到整體金融市場與總體經濟市場的後續表現。 本研究具有兩點特色：其一，過去既有相關文獻多僅討論「股價」的反應，本研究進一步針對股價以外的資訊，探討銀行發生危機後，對應所有往來公司在借款條件、投資融資等重大決策的變化，如此更能觀察危機事件所造成的長期衝擊。其二是過去國內從未有類似中興銀行，授信業務「全面」且「長期」性地被凍結，所以，中興銀行的案例提供我們回答「與危機銀行往來的企業，其未來投資所受到融資限制影響」一個純淨的觀察樣本。實證的主要結果發現：1.中興銀行與往來企業的體質有明顯的群聚相關，支持古典金融理論之逆選擇假說。2.將過去與中興銀行有借貸往來的企業，依照資訊不對稱程度區分為公開發行公司與上市櫃公司兩類，則在中興銀行發生財務危機後，僅有公開發行公司的投資受到顯著融資限制的情況；再者，其轉換到新銀行的借款條件也較為不利。

Using the crisis event of Chung-Shing Bank, we discuss the impacts of the distress bank on their client firms. From the micro viewpoint, we ask the first question: are performances of banks and firms links? From the macro viewpoint, we ask the second question: Which is a better financial system, market-dominated or bank-oriented? Unlike earlier studies, this study investigates the impacts to Chung-Shing Bank's clients for the multi-aspects, for example, the changes of their client firms' investments, financial constraints, stock prices, and loan contracts. Many economists maintain that large-scale interruptions in bank lending activities can propagate negative shocks to the real sector from the macro view. This also means that the adverse effects of banking relationship pertain to the consequences on a firm resulting from distress in the banking sector from the micro view. A shock to the bank-centered system may obstruct the diversification of a firm's funding source and investment and cause the financial constraints, given its strong relationship with the bank. On the other hand, it is typically though that a bank cannot perform well without a healthy corporate sector, of which is able to redeem debt, and thus reduce the non-performing loans. Thus the performances of the two sectors cannot theoretically be kept apart. Knowledge of the relationship between the corporate and banking sector is helpful for policy-makers. If the two sectors are isolated, policy makers need not worry about any contagious effects spreading from the financial sector to the non-financial one. By contrast, the rescue of one sector can often help in the recovery of the other. This means the authorities can save the least crisis-hit industries first, of which the recovery will spread over to the heavy crisis-hit industries. Crisis-induced changes in bank lending patterns could favor some firms over others, masking the damage caused by bank distress. To address these issues, we examine the behavior and performance of firms leaving the distress bank in the years surrounding the distress announcement. Overall, we find our investigation is similar to recent studies that use firm-level data from crisis periods in Japan and other East Asian countries. Unlike our paper, these studies find that negative shocks to banks harm borrowing firms.